Turbulent Times for the Aviation Industry and now Three Fatal Crashes

I will return to the terrible and unnecessary tragedy of the Air India Express Boeing crash in a moment but it is against a backdrop of financial and industrial disasters, all mixed the more vigorously by the shambles of the closed airspace due to a volcanic eruption.

If the airline financial failures that saw the new year in were not enough to test the system, we witnessed confusion and buck passing on a heroic scale when the Eyjafjallajokull volcano injected millions of tonnes of ash into our suffering atmosphere.

It is true that volcanic ash and aeroplanes do not mix well, as anyone who knows the dramatic story of the British Airways 747 will know. In 1982 when all four engines were stopped by volcanic ash, the mighty jumbo became a glider. Tenacious and professional action by Captain Eric Moody and his crew saved the day but the engines were scrap and the windshield opaque after the abrasive pumice cloud blasted the aircraft’s vitals.

Of course, Eric and his fellow voyagers flew right through the dense part of the cloud at night and so no wonder the results were serious. Why cancel so many flights then, when the cloud was known, traceable and, over a large area, pretty thin? My guess is that liability is the key.

Yes, safety must rule but who was going to say what was or wasn’t safe? The authorities needed data; who would supply it? Engine and aircraft manufacturers are the obvious source but had they done any tests to offer hard fact? Probably not. Would they risk corporate liability by offering an estimate? No way; and so we were grounded.

Passing the parcel can be an uncomfortable game and so it was this time. Airline bosses were able to shuck the blame by publicly berating the air traffic control service, gaining valuable publicity in the process.

We were at nature’s mercy and when the wind changed she flirted with us by providing a break before puffing ash southwards again and so confusion reigned once more. Some serious research needs to be done for the future or we will have our noses rubbed once again into the unpalatable fact that we still fail to control our environment and surmount the power of natural forces.

The saddest manifestation of human failure versus the laws of nature was the fatal crash of the Air India Express Boeing 737 at Mangalore. With my accident analyst hat on I would have to say that we can never know the full story until months of painstaking investigation is complete. With my pilot’s hat on I know that it is a combination of factors that cause accidents and one, at least, is often human error. What we do know is that the crew had been fling all night and were at their circadian low.

In a good airline with high professional standards, immense effort is exerted to mitigate human factors, as it is understood that even the best will make mistakes. Hands up anyone who can say they never have.

Sadly not all airlines are as professional and disciplined as they should be. The public is ignorant of who is safe and who are not, hence my attempts to put the issue into the public domain. This is not such an easy task. I will stick my neck out and say that this accident has all the hallmarks of a classic crew error. Unless we later discover that some unforeseeable and catastrophic event took place we must ask why an aircraft overshoots the runway end.

Going too fast? Landing to deep into the runway, so insufficient stopping distance remaining? Landing in heavy rain and possible windshear? Incorrect flap setting or other misconfiguration? – as in Indonesia in 2007/8, when an experienced Garuda captain landed with take off levels of flap set and the co-pilot did nothing. Incorrect performance calculations prior to landing? All these are crew errors and in a well disciplined operator should never arise. 

There are remedies for all these problems should they occur. A good crew will check and monitor one another. A 737-800, of the type we are considering, can touch down and still abort the landing into a go around; but someone has to first recognise the need and then initiate the correct actions. A good professional pilot will assume all landings will be a go around until proven otherwise. Sadly this professional mindset is not universal.

From what I know of Air India I have concerns about it’s record on this score and so I must conclude the worst. I will be criticised for jumping to conclusions or being biased – even racist – but look at the record. 4.89 fatal crashes per million flights. For comparison Quantas is zero, All Nippon .22 and Air India is only exceeded in Asia by China Airways of Taiwan at 7.16.

For comparison Southwest Airlines of the USA has Zero, Delta has .17 with British Airways the same and Virgin Atlantic Zero. I will leave the statistics game there as the point is well made.

Some allegations circulating within the industry regarding the culture in this airline are hair raising and so I fear my suspicions are that many people have died due to poor standards but I am only able to surmise and offer an opinion at this stage. Proof will emerge in time, providing the investigation is competent and truly independent. Not all are.

Air India was not alone in killing large numbers of people. The Polish air force and the Libyan airline Afriqiyah both crashed on approach in circumstances that raise serious questions about the cultures involved. Both airports had poor approach systems to the point of almost total ineffectiveness in the Polish case. We do know some of the details of the presidential Tupolev crash and they are shocking in the extreme. Pilots who lacked current raining in a simulator or even in the approach procedures required and apparently using bizarre, unorthodox methods to land in very limited visibility when the only sensible decision would have been to divert elsewhere. Then there is the extra person in the cockpit. Who were they and what were they dong there? Distracting or pressurizing the already challenged crew?

The Afriqiyah crash was that of a modern high tech airliner attempting a landing at a major airport (Tripoli) with dreadfully outdated and poorly maintained approach systems. The attempt was made in very poor conditions and it is possible that the crash occurred as the crew attempted a missed approach, whilst battling dawn sun and sandstorm conditions.

All we know for certain is the poor quality of the approach aids in Tripoli. A situation that is frankly unforgivable for a major oil-producing nation. It must be said that discipline would dictate that a diversion is necessary when conditions are below those required for a safe approach and we know that another aircraft aborted the approach and diverted. So why did the Libyan crew decide to continue? We may find out in due course but feedback I have from European pilots who have worked there describe differing training and operational cultures from those they are used to. It is very likely to be a factor but at this stage I can say little more than that.

This harsh economic climate creates pressures on all airlines. The test of the professionally run outfit is that they do not allow, fatigue, sloppy training, lack of experience or operational expediency to creep in and influence safety standards. I know from direct experience that this does not always happen.

And so the now seemingly trivial issue of industrial relations. British Airways, once the gold standard as an employer in the industry, is engaged in bitter inner strife that has all the appearance of a fight to the death. It would be a tragedy if the pleasant atmosphere in a BA cabin suffers from such poor industrial relations. It is hard to see how it can emerge unscathed given what we now witness in the media every day. Whatever we do witness, you can be certain it is not the whole truth as neither side will be completely open with the media and spin will abound. Perhaps afterwards we will get the real story.

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